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The distinction between the federal and state law on the issue of
retroactivity is presented in Griffith v. Kentucky. 184 The federal
law, similar to the state view, disallows collateral attack of final
convictions using the three part test enunciated in Stovall v.
Denno. 185 The test analyzes: "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the
186
administration of justice of the new standards."
Although the Stovall test is similar to the three prong analysis
of Mitchell and Pepper, their application contrasts as the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Griffith provided that "new
rules governing criminal procedure should be retroactive to cases
pending on direct review."' 187 The majority opinion expressed
concern over what would amount to disparate treatment of
similarly situated defendants if the new rule only applied to the
case at bar, while leaving the old rule to apply to cases on direct
review. 188 Thus, if the new rule encompassed some federal
constitutional principles, it would be applied retroactively.
Whereas if the new rule involved solely a construction of state
law, the retroactivity of the new rule would be analyzed under
the three-prong analysis enunciated in Mitchell and Pepper.
People v. Goodwin 189
(decided November 10, 1994)
The defendant, Linnie Goodwin, claimed his right to a speedy
trial, as protected by both the United States Constitution 19 0 and
184. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
185. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
186. Id. at 297.
187. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 326.
188. Id. at 323.
189. 618 N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... "). See United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (stating that the right to a speedy trial acts to
limit pretrial incarceration, to lessen the anxiety accompanying public
association, and to limit delays which may impair an adequate defense).
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New York State Constitution, 19 1 was violated by the introduction
of certain "unduly suggestive" evidence, 192 and the People's
failure to meet the statutory "speedy trial" provisions, as set forth
in the New York Criminal Procedure Law. 193 The defendant
asserted that his State 19 4 and Federal1 95 Constitutional rights of
due process were violated.

The Appellate Division,

First

Department, disagreed and held that the defendant was not
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, since it was defendant's
counsel who had consented to, requested, and participated in a
majority of adjournments which delayed the trial. 196 The court
also ruled that there was no state or federal constitutional
violation relating to the alleged unduly suggestive nature of an
out-of-court identification of defendant's clothing.197
On February 6, 1992, the defendant was convicted of two
counts of felony criminal possession of a weapon and one count
191. Although the New York State Constitution contains no speedy trial
provisions, applicable New York constitutional guarantees of due process are
set forth by article I, § 6, which states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without the due process of law." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. See also N.Y. CRi,. PRoc. LAW § 30.20 practice
commentaries (McKinney 1992) ("A speedy trial is guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution's Sixth Amendment, applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the XIV Amendment... as well as by certain aspects of due process
under the New York Constitution .... ").
192. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
193. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 30.20 (McKinney 1992). Section 30.20
states, in pertinent part: "After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant
is entitled to a speedy trial." Id. See N.Y. CRI. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a)
(McKinney 1992). Section 30.30(l)(a) states in part: "[A] motion... [to
dismiss]... must be granted where the people are not ready for trial
within... six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony ...." Id.
194. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without the due process of
law." Id.
195. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part:
"IN]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
the due process of law ..... Id.
196. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
197. Id. at 634.
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of felony assault. As a result, defendant received lengthy,
concurrent prison sentences. 198 The commencement of the
criminal action began on November 26, 1989, with the filing of a
felony complaint by the People. 199 Section 30.30 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law provides that the People are
required to announce their readiness for trial within 181 days of
the commencement of a criminal action where the defendant is
200
charged with at least one felony.
The court in Goodwin viewed the defendant's "speedy trial"
claim from a statutory standpoint rather than as a constitutional
one. 2 01 The Goodwin court cited People v. Sinistaj,202 in which
the New York Court of Appeals viewed section 30.30 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law2 03 as "not addressing problems
involving speedy trial rights or due process in a constitutional
sense. Rather it is purely a statutory 'readiness rule.' It was
enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt
"204
prosecutorial readiness for trial ....
The Goodwin court merely looked at the facts of the case and

found that the majority of adjournments and delays were
requested or consented to by the defense and as such could not be

held against the People. 205

198. Id. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 4-12 years, 2
1/3 to 7 years and 2 1/3 to 7 years for criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and assault
in the second degree, respectively. Id.
199. Id.
200. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992).
201. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
202. 67 N.Y.2d 236, 492 N.E.2d 1209, 501 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1986).
203. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 30.30.
204. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d at 239, 492 N.E.2d at 1210, 501 N.Y.S.2d at
794. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.20 practice commentaries (McKinney
1992). The Goodwin court reached its conclusions on this issue by observing
that certain lengths of time are excludable, or more precisely, deductible from
the statutory period in which the people must be ready for trial. Id. at 239, 492
N.E.2d at 1210, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 794; see also People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d
841, 843, 588 N.E.2d 82, 83, 580 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1992).
205. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 634. But see People v. Tarnovich, 37
N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975). The determination of
whether a speedy trial was denied is approached by using a balancing test
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Examining the constitutionality of an out-of-court clothing
identification, 2 06 the Goodwin court relied heavily upon People
v. Johnson.20 7 The court in Johnson found no violation of a
defendant's constitutional right to due process where "identity of
the clothing is not an element bf the crime charged and bears
only circumstantially on the identification of defendant." 20 8 The
Johnson court held that any error by the court, in allowing such
evidence of prior clothing identification, was "rendered harmless
by the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt." 20 9 In
Goodwin, "overwhelming" evidence was introduced which was

comprised of testimony by an eyewitness to the actual
shooting, 2 10 evidence from the crime scene which was dirdetly
linked to the gun seen in the possession of the defendant, and
2 11
defendant's fingerprints on the gun.
Under federal law, as held by the Supreme Court,
"inadmissibility" will be considered only when the totality of the
2 12
circumstances suggest the risk of irreparable misidentification.
A "per se rule" which excludes evidence of pre-trial
identification whenever it is made under inherently suggestive

supplied by the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 445, 335 N.E.2d at 306,
373 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The court looks at the fbllowing factors: (1) the extent of
delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4)
whether there has been extended pre-trial incarceration; (5) whether the
defense has been impaired in any way by reason of the delay. Id.
206. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
207: 155 A.D.2d 236, 546 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1st Dep't 1989).
208. Id. at 237, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
209. Id.
210. Goodwin, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 634. A photographer, standing nearby,
witnessed the shooting. Id. A second witness observed Goodwin flee with what
appeared to be a gun. Id. Goodwin's fingerprints were found on a gun. Id.
Several witnesses identified clothing, worn by the gunman, as being the same
as those worn by Goodwin. Id. Finally, Goodwin was observed in the area
where the gun and spent shells were recovered shortly after the shooting. Id.
211. Id.

212. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 (1977) ("[l]nflexible rules of
exclusion that may frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed
recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm.").
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circumstances will not be adopted as a necessary component of
2 13
federal due process.

The New York Court of Appeals has often afforded additional
protections above those set by the federal law. 2 14 In the area of

pretrial identification, the court has expanded protections beyond

2 15
those minimum standards established by the Supreme Court.

Despite these expanded protections, no "per se rule" excluding
evidence of unduly suggestive pretrial identification, has been
utilized in New York. In People v. Adams,2 16 the New York
Court of Appeals found that an out-of-court identification of the

defendant was "so impermissibly suggestive"' 2 17 that any
testimony related to the identification should have been excluded.
However, the error was deemed harmless, and did not require
213. Id. at 110-14.
214. See Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979) The court re-emphasized its position stating:
We have not hesitated when we concluded that the Federal Constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court fell short of adequate protection for
our citizens to rely upon the principle that that document defines the
minimum level of individual rights and leaves the States free to provide
greater rights for its citizens through its Constitution, statutes or rule
making authority.
Id.; People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82, 406
N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1978) (holding that "under our own State due process
clause.., this court may impose higher standards than those held to be
necessary by the Supreme Court under the corresponding constitutional
provision").
215. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 335, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629, 361
N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (1974) (holding that "the right to counsel [at pretrial
identification viewing] under the State Constitution has, in some areas, been
interpreted more expansively than under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as
interpreted by the Supreme Court").
216. 53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).
217. Id. at 248-49, 423 N.E.2d at 382, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 905. The subjects
were shown to the victims at one time, increasing the likelihood that
identification of one subject would taint the identification and unduly suggest
the guilt of the other subjects. Id. The defendant, who was not apprehended at
the scene, was shown to the victims along with other suspects who were
arrested immediately outside the scene of the robbery. Id. This show-up
identification did not occur until hours after the robbery; show-ups are usually
done at the scene and immediately after the occurrence. Id.
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reversal of the defendant's robbery conviction since there was
proper identification at trial by five eyewitnesses to the crime. 2 18
Wortzman v. Kaladjian 2 19
(decided October 20, 1994)

Petitioner claimed that respondent's method of calculation used
to determine petitioner's eligibility for medical assistance violated
his right to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by
both the New York State 2 0 and Federal22 1 Constitutions. 222
Petitioner alleged that the method of calculation was arbitrary and
22 3
capricious and sought relief through an article 78 proceeding.
Petitioner requested a declaration that the respondent had violated
his constitutional rights. 224 Furthermore, petitioner sought an
order directing respondent to retroactively recalculate his
eligibility "based on his actual expenses and an allocation of a

personal needs allowance." 22 5 Although the Appellate Division,
218. Id. at 252, 423 N.E.2d at 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
219. 617 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
220. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision provides: "No person shall be deprived the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." Id.
221. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision provides: "No state
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. This provision provides: "No
state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws." Id.
222. Wortzman, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
223. Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law & Rules § 7803, provides for
judicial review of respondent's determination of the issue raised in the
proceeding to consider "whether a determination was made in violation of
lawful proedure ... or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion .... "N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1993).
224. WorMa, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
225. Id. at 467. Petitioner contended that eligibility should be
based upon a computation of his net income which treats as surplus
income available to meet medical expenses only Petitioner's net income
after deduction of the payment actually made to the adult care facility in
each month and the personal allowance provided in that month under
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